Title: The Cartoon Controversy: Offence, Identity, Oppression?
Author(s): Sune Lagaard
Journal: Political Studies 55?(3).

Move	Introduction 3: Full text
Move 1: Establish A Territory	On 30 September 2005, twelve cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad were published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten along with an article lamenting the alleged self-censorship in cultural circles with respect to Muslims and Islam. One drawing simply depicts Mohammad in the desert; two combine Mohammad with Islamic symbols like the crescent and the star; one is of a boy named Mohammad writing 'the editors of Jyllands-Posten are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs' on a blackboard in Arabic letters; and two satirise a Danish author, whose claim not to be able to find illustrators for a children's book about Mohammad started the whole affair. Others somehow associate the Prophet, Islam or Muslims with terrorism: one shows Mohammad with a turban in the shape of an ignited bomb with verses from the Qur'an inscribed on it; another portrays the Prophet in Paradise, saying 'Stop, Stop. We ran out of virgins' to a long line of suicide bombers; two refer to the fear of cartoonists that pictures of Mohammad will trigger revenge from Muslims; and two link the Prophet with suppression of women. The publication sparked, first, a domestic controversy over the place of Muslims in Danish society and the limits of freedom of expression and, later, an international crisis between Denmark, and increasingly other European countries, and much of the Muslim world. During the controversy the publication was repeatedly criticised for being wrong, mostly by offended Muslims but also by other religious groups and some liberals.
Move 2: Establish A Niche	The present article considers what might make a publication like that of the Mohammad cartoons morally problematic, and (considers) whether such moral features would justify the demands by some critics for legal restrictions on freedom of expression. The discussion accordingly distinguishes between whether an act of expression is (a) imprudent or unwise; (b) morally problematic (bad, wrong); and (c) whether it should, for either of these reasons, be legally restricted (prohibited).
Move 3: Present the Present Work	The article addresses these issues via a discussion of what was normatively at stake in the Rushdie affair, i.e. freedom of expression and toleration. The reason for drawing on discussions of the Rushdie affair is that (a) the two cases are very similar in most of the relevant respects; (b) most of the critical discussion has been framed very much like those used in discussions of the Rushdie affair; and (c) the cartoon controversy has to date not received much systematic theoretical treatment comparable to the treatments of the Rushdie affair considered here. The article suggests that a liberal model of toleration which gives a high priority to freedom of expression and toleration can acknowledge several of the moral reasons as legitimate against publication. Although some of the complaints against the publication may be genuine and legitimate from a liberal point of view, they are generally not sufficient to justify legal restrictions on freedom of expression. There might, however, be problematic features beyond those that can be thus acknowledged and it is considered under what conditions one such feature might justify legal restrictions on freedom of expression.